Syndemic health crises-The growing role of National Public Health Institutes in shaping a coordinated response.

Countries across the world are experiencing syndemic health crises where infectious pathogens including COVID-19 interact with epidemics of communicable and non-communicable diseases. Combined with war, environmental instability and the effects of soaring inflation, a public health crisis has emerged requiring an integrated response. Increasingly, national public health institutes (NPHIs) are at the forefront of leading this, as demonstrated at the 2022 Annual Meeting of the International Association of National Public Health Institutes (IANPHI). These effects are particularly evident where conflict is exacerbating health crises in Ukraine and Somalia. In Ukraine, medical and public health workers have been killed and infrastructure destroyed, which require major efforts to rebuild to international standards. In Somalia, these crises are magnified by the effects of climate change, leading to greater food insecurity, heat-related deaths and famine. National public health institutes are crucial in these contexts and many others to support integrated political responses where health challenges span local, national and international levels and involve multiple stakeholders. This can be seen in strengthening of Integrated Disease Surveillance and work towards the Sustainable Development Goals. National public health institutes also provide integration through the international system, working jointly to build national capacities to deliver essential public health functions. In this context, the 2022 IANPHI Annual meeting agreed the Stockholm Statement, highlighting the role that NPHIs play in tackling the causes and effects of interconnected global and local challenges to public health. This represents an important step in addressing complex health crises and syndemics which require whole-of-society responses, with NPHIs uniquely placed to work across sectors and provide system leadership in response.

Global and regional governance of One Health and implications for global health security.

The apparent failure of global health security to prevent or prepare for the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need for closer cooperation between human, animal (domestic and wildlife), and environmental health sectors. However, the many institutions, processes, regulatory frameworks, and legal instruments with direct and indirect roles in the global governance of One Health have led to a fragmented, global, multilateral health security architecture. We explore four challenges: first, the sectoral, professional, and institutional silos and tensions existing between human, animal, and environmental health; second, the challenge that the international legal system, state sovereignty, and existing legal instruments pose for the governance of One Health; third, the power dynamics and asymmetry in power between countries represented in multilateral institutions and their impact on priority setting; and finally, the current financing mechanisms that predominantly focus on response to crises, and the chronic underinvestment for epidemic and emergency prevention, mitigation, and preparedness activities. We illustrate the global and regional dimensions to these four challenges and how they relate to national needs and priorities through three case studies on compulsory licensing, the governance of water resources in the Lake Chad Basin, and the desert locust infestation in east Africa. Finally, we propose 12 recommendations for the global community to address these challenges. Despite its broad and holistic agenda, One Health continues to be dominated by human and domestic animal health experts. Substantial efforts should be made to address the social-ecological drivers of health emergencies including outbreaks of emerging, re-emerging, and endemic infectious diseases. These drivers include climate change, biodiversity loss, and land-use change, and therefore require effective and enforceable legislation, investment, capacity building, and integration of other sectors and professionals beyond health.

Building the evidence base for global health policy: the need to strengthen institutional networks, geographical representation and global collaboration.

National public health institutes and WHO collaborating centres, and their global networks, are a key resource to support public health system strengthening with essential public health functions and generate evidence for health policy central to national health and socioeconomic development. The COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare global inequities in public health capacities, made urgent the need to examine sources of global knowledge and understand how to better invest in and use public health institutes and their capacities. This analysis paper incorporates experiences and perspectives from the WHO and International Association of Public Health Associations including the ongoing pandemic and work conducted in the UK-WHO 'Tackling Deadly Diseases in Africa Programme'. We acknowledge geographical disparities in public health capacities both within and across countries and regions, provide examples of novel ways of working for global health actors, and define the challenging environment in which public health authorities operate. We identify four incentives for all countries to invest in public health and strengthen institutions: (1) transparency and trust; (2) socioeconomic dividends; (3) collective health protection and (4) knowledge sharing and equity. By pursuing shared priorities; enabling voices from low-resource settings to be more equitably heard; facilitating collaboration and learning within and across regions, we articulate actionable next steps to develop and better harness public health institutes and international networks.

Improving National Intelligence for Public Health Preparedness: a methodological approach to finding local multi-sector indicators for health security.

The COVID-19 epidemic is the latest evidence of critical gaps in our collective ability to monitor country-level preparedness for health emergencies. The global frameworks that exist to strengthen core public health capacities lack coverage of several preparedness domains and do not provide mechanisms to interface with local intelligence. We designed and piloted a process, in collaboration with three National Public Health Institutes (NPHIs) in Ethiopia, Nigeria and Pakistan, to identify potential preparedness indicators that exist in a myriad of frameworks and tools in varying local institutions. Following a desk-based systematic search and expert consultations, indicators were extracted from existing national and subnational health security-relevant frameworks and prioritised in a multi-stakeholder two-round Delphi process. Eighty-six indicators in Ethiopia, 87 indicators in Nigeria and 51 indicators in Pakistan were assessed to be valid, relevant and feasible. From these, 14-16 indicators were prioritised in each of the three countries for consideration in monitoring and evaluation tools. Priority indicators consistently included private sector metrics, subnational capacities, availability and capacity for electronic surveillance, measures of timeliness for routine reporting, data quality scores and data related to internally displaced persons and returnees. NPHIs play an increasingly central role in health security and must have access to data needed to identify and respond rapidly to public health threats. Collecting and collating local sources of information may prove essential to addressing gaps; it is a necessary step towards improving preparedness and strengthening international health regulations compliance.

Using critical information to strengthen pandemic preparedness: the role of national public health agencies.

COVID-19 has demonstrated that most countries' public health systems and capacities are insufficiently prepared to prevent a localised infectious disease outbreak from spreading. Strengthening national preparedness requires National Public Health Institutes (NPHIs), or their equivalent, to overcome practical challenges affecting timely access to, and use of, data that is critical to preparedness. Our situational analysis in collaboration with NPHIs in three countries-Ethiopia, Nigeria and Pakistan-characterises these challenges. Our findings indicate that NPHIs' role necessitates collection and analysis of data from multiple sources that do not routinely share data with public health authorities. Since initiating requests for access to new data sources can be a lengthy process, it is essential that NPHIs are routinely monitoring a broad set of priority indicators that are selected to reflect the country-specific context. NPHIs must also have the authority to be able to request rapid sharing of data from public and private sector organisations during health emergencies and to access additional human and financial resources during disease outbreaks. Finally, timely, transparent and informative communication of synthesised data from NPHIs will facilitate sustained data sharing with NPHIs from external organisations. These actions identified by our analysis will support the availability of robust information systems that allow relevant data to be collected, shared and analysed by NPHIs sufficiently rapidly to inform a timely local response to infectious disease outbreaks in the future.